

THE UBIQUITY OF VALUES AND THE PLANNING PROCESS

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INTRODUCTION

This paper falls within what may be called the *contextual theory* of planning. This type of planning theory should be distinguished from two other types of planning theory: *procedural theory*, which studies the planning process and includes such topics as description of that process, rationality and planning, methods of goal setting, and strategies for plan evaluation; and *substantive theory*, which is a body of knowledge about the subject-matter for the various planning fields – the various urban and regional processes and the possibilities for directing them through planning. The present paper provides a theoretical discussion of the value-context for planning. Other topics for the contextual theory of planning could include the political context, the economic context, or the philosophical context within which planning, as a human activity, is undertaken.

Much has recently been written about the dynamics of values and their intervention in planning. The importance for the planner to recognize the dynamics of value-intervention – both on his own part and on the part of his employers and the plan's public – is now gaining recognition.¹ The purpose of the present paper is to present a theoretical model of the various cumulative sources ("loci") of values, and thus to sensitize planners to the ubiquity of values.

The meaning given to "values" in this paper is based on that provided by Clyde Kluckhohn. It does not suggest however that there is not always some relational dimension in value considerations. Thus when mention is made of "social values" and "subcultural values" and "personal values" there is the implied notion always of something or some situation or some method or some person being of some benefit to, or desired by, someone else or some group. This relativeness to specific individuals or groups grounds the attempt in analysis to clarify the ubiquity of values in the planning process – and in this paper meaning principally the urban planning process. This planning process is taken to be characterized (but not exclusively so) as a process during which knowledge is applied in a rational manner to the formulation of a comprehensive program through which anticipated future developments may be directed toward some goal. "Value" is taken to mean "a cognitive assumption about the desirable or the undesirable to which its holder is affectively committed (whether consciously or not) and which influences his perception of the range of alternative actions or views from which he may select . . ."²

I. SOCIAL VALUES AND PLANNING

Most, perhaps all, values a person holds are acquired through the lifelong process of socialization. For the purpose of the present model, let us distinguish between

two types of socialization processes which every planner undergoes: *general socialization* and *professional socialization*. The first type is the socially-formative one, centering upon childhood; it is through this process that the mother-tongue and its associated thought-patterns are learned.

The second type is logically subsumed under the first; however, its specific relevance to planning merits a separate consideration. The first process is undergone by planners, employers and public. Values acquired through this process are therefore shared by these three bodies (see Figure 1). The loci of socially-acquired values will now be considered in terms of their impingement upon planning, via the planner, the public or the employer.

A. Values and Knowledge

Humans are cognitive, or knowing, beings. It seems that even in this very fundamental level there are value-tinged assumptions.

Epistemologists have been arguing for centuries about the exact nature of knowledge. Several contending theories have been advanced about the meaning of statements implying knowledge. Whatever position one holds, it seems that one cannot escape the holding of assumptions – even if they be as basic as the assumption that we exist, or that reason, or logic, are valid sources of knowledge. Granted,




Figure 1: The Value Context for Planning

assumptions are not yet values; the self-committing and affective elements must still be supplied. Yet the fervor with which alternative epistemological positions are held, at least by philosophers, seems to indicate that something approaching the holding of values is often involved.

Needless to say, planning is a body of knowledge and involves intellectual processes. Thus, whatever value-tinged assumptions underlie the knowledge function permeate planning knowledge as well.

B. Values and Language

The important place language-socialization holds in early life would seem to indicate that language is a major locus of values. The linguistic relativity hypothesis has been proposed by cultural anthropologists, led by Benjamin Lee Whorf, as an explanation for the value-formative effect of language socialization. Language, the hypothesis holds, shapes community values and hence, through socialization, shapes individual values as well. This is achieved on the individual-cognitive level. As Whorf has put it, ". . . the linguistic system . . . is . . . the shaper of ideas, the program and guide for the individual's mental activity . . ."³

When the planner, public and employer all belong to the same linguistic culture and sub-group, language-based values would have little overt significance for planning. However, where the planner, public or employer belong to two linguistic sub-groups, language-based values could become a dynamic force. If, for example, the planner – who usually shares middle or upper-middle class values – is undertaking planning for a lower-class public, his language, especially in terms of language facility, would differ significantly from the "client's" level. The language-associated values may help or hinder the planning process, depending on the skill with which they are handled. Even where there is little class difference between the planner and the public, language-based values may intervene nevertheless, since by the very act of re-stating issues in professional terminology, the planner would be manipulating values (his own and others').⁴

C. Societal Values

Excepting some very few universal values, most values are unique to each cultural group or related cultures. Let us look at the two major value-clusters relevant to planning that characterize the ideology shared (to a large extent) by the United States and Canada. Two major value-clusters relevant to planning may be identified for these two societies. We shall call the first the "individualism-democracy" cluster, and the second the "scientism" cluster.

The *individualism-democracy* value cluster has historically characterized North-American ideology from its inception, and still constitutes its backbone. The cluster contains such familiar values as individualism, privacy, free choice, private ownership, free enterprise, political democracy, equal opportunity, etc. Not all values in the cluster necessarily always reinforce each other, although originally they may have constituted a cohesive cluster. Today there is the tendency among "liberals" to stress the values of equality more than individualism, reinterpreting them to imply not a decentralized economy and political structure, but a directed economy and a more centralized democracy.

The implications of this value-cluster for planning are clear: traditionally, this

value-cluster has generated resistance to planning because planning implies control or direction, and these activities have often been construed as limiting individual freedom, or free enterprise, or even of being anti-democratic.

The *scientism* value-cluster includes other familiar values of the North American ideology: efficiency, technological progress, expertise, the rational method, and the scientific approach. This value-cluster has its roots in the ages of rationalism and enlightenment – deep roots indeed. The potency of this cluster has not diminished over the years; today it seems to be on the ascendancy.

It is the scientism value-cluster that has propelled planning to its present position, against the current of the individualism cluster (See Figure 2). The positive




Figure 2: The Ideological Justification for Planning in North America

evaluation of science, of rationality, of expertise and of progress, has been extended to planning as well. Thus, planning has been valued as a “scientific” instrument, capable of achieving rationally-directed control and progress. The scientism cluster may be regarded as the “enabling ideology” of planning.

However, as long as a strong value-force such as the individualistic tradition resisted planning, it could not become firmly rooted. Planners and planning ideologists have therefore always attempted to reconcile planning with individualism and democracy. This may not be an impossible task to achieve. For one thing, the two value-clusters do, in fact, co-exist, and not always in a state of tension.⁵

Furthermore, there are signs that a reconciliation may not be as difficult a task as it may have been several decades ago. Some of the values in the individualism-

democracy cluster that have been most antagonistic to planning, such as laissez-faire, have been losing their force; the opposition to government control in many spheres of life, including planning, has been mitigated.

Planners, too, are doing their share toward achieving a better co-existence between planning and democracy: the relatively recent calls for the politicization and democratization of planning are an overt expression of the underlying value dynamics.⁶ Citizen participation, advocacy planning and client analysis are all doing their share for a wider and unambivalent acceptance of planning in a democratic society.

Societal values, then, are important forces shaping and directing planning. We have identified the two major value-clusters with relevance for planning. This relevance is not only restricted to the justification of or opposition to planning (discussed above), but extends through almost every stage and element of the planning process (and thus intervenes in planning *directly*), as well as into the institutional settings for planning, the values of the public and employers, and the substantive areas for planning (and thus intervenes *indirectly*).

D. Subcultural Values

Some values relevant to planning are shared by most members of a society. These we have already identified above. Other values characterize various sub-groups in the society, such as social classes, ethnic groups, religious groups, political groups, etc. Every person is socialized to accept the values of one or more of these sub-cultures. This holds true for the planner, his employers, and the public.

Let us look at the planners first. Since the class-affiliation of most planners is middle or upper-middle class, they would probably have been socialized into the corresponding class values, whether through the process of general socialization or through the process of professional socialization. It is not surprising, therefore, that the planner has often been said to impose his "middle-class values" on others,⁷ or to incorporate his sub-cultural values into his plans.⁸

The relationship between the planner and his employers would be facilitated if both sides shared the same sub-cultural values. In the United States, municipal government has traditionally been the realm of politicians of working-class origin. There are indications, however, that middle-class and upper-class politicians are increasingly becoming interested in municipal politics. Greater value-compatibility between the planner and his politician-employer could usher in a new era of better planner-politician relations.⁹

The area of sub-cultural value incompatibility that has received the most attention has been planner-public relations in cases where the plan's public have been the poor. The value-gap between planners and residents of urban renewal areas or public housing projects has been much discussed.¹⁰

Finally, sub-cultural values held by the general public may become relevant for planning in certain situations. For example, the general public's opinion about planning may be expressed via such media as the vote or the public hearing. In these situations it may become significant, on the one hand, whether the planner and the general community share many sub-cultural values and, on the other hand, whether or not sub-cultural differences are the sources of intra-community value conflict.

E. Personal Values

For the sake of logical completeness, and in order to avoid taking the stand of social determinism, a residual category of values must also be included: personal values (indicated in Figure I with broken lines). Personal values depend much on each person's unique experiences and psychological makeup. They may intervene in the planning process both from the side of the planner, and from the direction of the public or employers.

II. PLANNING PROFESSIONAL VALUES

The loci of social values discussed above, acquired through the process of general socialization, are shared by planner, public and employer alike. We now turn to those loci of values acquired through professional socialization by members of the planning profession, and shared exclusively by planners (and, to an extent, by members of some other professions).

A. Values and the Scientific Method

Over the past few decades the realization has been maturing that science, be it "pure" and objective as it may, cannot escape the intrusion of values. Thus, even if planning should strive to become as "scientific" as possible – and it clearly has not yet reached this stage – planning could not even then hope to become entirely value-free.

First let us view science as a social institution. We have already discussed the cluster of social values which we called "scientism." It is the values in this cluster that have permitted science (and planning) to flourish as it has in the United States and Canada. Thus, certain value assumptions underlie science as a social institution, giving it its *raison d'être*. Without the fundamental value assumption that the pursuit of knowledge and truth is good, the justification for science would have been undermined.¹¹

Other values are equally essential to the operation of science. These are the values sometimes identified as the "scientific ethic" which the scientist acquires during the process of professional socialization. The scientific ethic includes such values as honesty, consistency, objectivity, verification, originality, freedom of speech, willingness to accept valid criticism, etc.¹² It is precisely because science, as a social institution, harbors *values* such as the above, that one can attempt to eradicate *bias* from scientific inquiry.¹³

Thus, to the extent that planning uses scientific methods, the above values characterize planning as well. There is, however, a major difference between planning as a discipline and planning as a profession. The planner undertaking basic research probably shares the values associated with the scientific method. But the planner acting as a professional requires a professional ethic to guide him, over and above the scientific ethic. As yet, however, the professional ethic of planning is only in its embryonic stages (see section D).

Values intervene in planning as a science-based discipline from another point of view as well, the point of view of science as a human operation. This operation may be described as a series of decisions involving judgements. Judgements, as scholars have emphasized,¹⁴ may be based on extra-scientific criteria, often on criteria with a value element in them. Judgements, Gunnar Myrdal has noted, enter

into every stage of the scientific inquiry process: the selection of the problem for study (what the scientist deems important); the questions to be asked and their ordering; the instruments and methods used; the resources expended; the decision whether to accept or reject an hypothesis (the level of significance for a decision either way must in many cases be selected by the researcher); the interpretations made; and the form of presentation.¹⁵ These judgements do not necessarily imply the intervention of *bias*, although this may be the case; but they do imply the intervention of *values*. Not only is planning prone to this form of intervention, but to the extent that it has not yet sharpened its tools to full scientific status (whether as a natural science, a social science, or both), it is probably more vulnerable than other disciplines.

Finally, the motives that lead a person to become a scientist (or planner) are also extra-scientific, and thus constitute an avenue to value intervention.

B. Values and the Social Sciences

Planning has incorporated many aspects of the social sciences. Let us therefore look at the value charge which the social sciences add to the previous value load.

The social sciences have made considerable headway in adapting the scientific method to their particular needs. But by becoming "scientific" the social sciences have not, of course, shut the door to the intervention of values. Rather, they have inherited the entire value-equipment that comes with the scientific method.

Moreover, despite attempts to argue to the contrary,¹⁶ the social sciences are, in fact, more vulnerable to the intrusion of values than the natural sciences. Let us elaborate.

First, because social institutions are founded upon values, whatever the social scientist studies pertains to values at least indirectly. Moreover, the fact that the subjects of the social sciences are human beings presents these sciences with ethical dilemmas unique to them: what tools are permissible for use by the social scientist? what ethical justification does he have for using tools that may have some unintentional manipulative effect? and how will the social scientist justify intentional social manipulation – the position in which planners often operate? The social sciences (and planning, in its social-science aspects) clearly need an ethic of their own, over and above the scientific ethic to which they subscribe. Second, because the social scientist is himself part of a social structure and shares social values, the values comprising the scientific ethic which constitute the "built in control" against bias must operate ever more powerfully than in the natural sciences in order to ensure the same degree of objectivity.

Finally, in addition to the values in the "scientism" cluster, the social sciences have had an "enabling ideology" of their own. This is the rising social awareness, the consideration granted to the individual's social, economic and psychological needs. Without this supporting ideology the social sciences would not have flourished in recent years as they have. In fact, there are indications that the social sciences are paradoxically *themselves* becoming a kind of popular ideology – or rather, a substitute ideology which has stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the receding traditional ideologies.¹⁷ This trend is clearly reflected in the changing planning ideology expressed in its increasing emphasis on social considerations (see D below).

C. Values and the Applied Sciences

To this point, we have dealt with the intervention of values into the "pure" sciences. We noted that, to the extent that the planning discipline and profession utilizes the scientific method or adopts the point of view of the social sciences, it also unconsciously accepts these two sources as loci of values for the planning process. But planning is not a "pure" science (if any science may be so regarded). To the extent that it is a science, planning is an applied science, for it seeks to control or direct phenomena toward some future goal.

Any applied science must concern itself with the *goals for application*. This is especially true of planning, because the changes it initiates are often long-lasting and difficult to alter. These goals cannot be furnished by the scientific method; nor do the social sciences hold much promise, since their advocates do not tire of arguing that these sciences strive to be value-free (and because goals cannot be set in a value vacuum, also goal-free). It is then left to the public, the politician, or the applied scientist himself (e.g., the planner), to set the goals for application. The questions of *what* goals to set, and of *whose* values shall prevail in setting them, are major issues for planning, drawing upon differing value pools.

D. The Planning Ideology and Ethic

In our discussion of professionally-acquired values we have seen that the planner is heir to the cumulative values residing in planning as a science, a social science, and an applied science. Let us now see whether planning as such is a carrier of values.

Although it may be difficult to designate a clearly-identifiable planning ideology, it is nevertheless possible to identify some ideological strains in the development of city planning in the United States and Canada.

Two ideological streams have characterized the history of city planning in North America: a reformist-utopian stream, and a conservative stream. The two have always existed side by side, undergoing different interpretations, with one or the other predominating at certain times and among certain planners. Partially overlapping and intersecting with these have been two methodological streams with ideological overtones: physical determinism, and social awareness.

Planners are heirs, notes Meyerson, to two utopian traditions: the general literary utopias and their vision of the good life, and the architect's design utopias, where utopian physical surroundings were proposed as the means by which the good life may be achieved.¹⁸ The future-orientation of planning and its function of creating change have made it most receptive to utopian thinking. Early city planners, many of whom were architects, extended the design-utopia tradition to city planning, seeking to achieve social reform through their physical plans; i.e., they were physical determinists.

This point of view expressed itself at least to some degree in such landmark schemes as (notes Gans) the playground and settlement house movements, as well as such later movements as the public housing and garden city movements.¹⁹ All these schemes share the conception that a better life will be created through the proposed physical configuration. An example of this type of thinking is described by Stanley Buder about the model company town of Pullman.²⁰ It was hoped or assumed that the laborers, once placed in the exceedingly high-standard physical

surroundings planned for them, would immediately reform to "decency" (what today would be called the "middle-class way of life").

The reformist-utopian tradition endures today, in a reinterpreted form. For with the advent of the social sciences and their associated values, and with the growing number of city planners with a social science training, this tradition is in the process of parting ways with physical determinism, and of adopting the new social awareness (at times bordering on social determinism).

The new strain of the reformist-utopian ideology rejects physical determinism, hoping to achieve social change directly (through social change as such) with the aid of the social welfare planner (whom the city planner sometimes resembles closely). As evidence of this ideological change we see, for example, the skepticism now expressed about the causal connection between housing and social attributes.²¹

The second ideological stream in planning is conservatism. To a large extent, city planning became accepted and institutionalized in the United States and Canada not because of its reformist ideals, but because it aided the interests and values of the dominant classes. Zoning is a well-known case in point. It became accepted probably not so much as an instrument for ensuring light and air, aesthetic pleasantness or absence of nuisances, as for its capacity to maintain property values.²²

In the process of professional socialization, then, planners acquire values derived from two ideological streams, possibly antithetical, but not necessarily so. Both ideological streams exist concurrently today. The extent to which a planner adopts values from one or the other of these streams depends on complex factors, some of which have been identified in the above sections. Let us now identify another factor of significance.

We have mentioned the concept of professional socialization several times above, without elaborating. We can now distinguish between two stages of professional socialization:

- a. the period of official graduate planning education at a university (as well as the background period of education in an undergraduate discipline, to a lesser extent);
- b. the period of unofficial socialization during the years of professional practice.

The values inculcated in the two periods may differ significantly. Indeed, the values adopted in the first period may at times be compromised as the planner begins to work professionally. In city planning schools the planner may be socialized to accept the reformist ideology of the new social-awareness strain; but as he begins to work, the pressures of the job may make him more conservative.²³

We see, then, that whatever planning ideology exists is not enough for ensuring some uniformity among the values of planners, nor for ensuring some set standards of professional work. In other professions there is usually a *professional ethic* over and above the professional ideology. This would be the professional equivalent of the scientific ethic, whose importance as a control against bias we have already noted. The professional ethic would express institutionalized professional values, designed to ensure some measure of professional objectivity and uniformity. The values constituting this professional ethic would be the most important values which the process of professional socialization of both stages would seek to inculcate.

The planning profession does not yet have a coherent professional ethic. The

absence of such an ethic may be gauged by the lack of institutionalized sanctions for breaking the code (whatever it may be). In short, then, as Francine Rabinovitz has noted,²⁴ planning is not yet fully professionalized. The planner is thus left to depend on whatever combination of values he might hold as a guide to such pivotal questions as what tools and methods are permissible for him to use, how to act regarding the proper relationship between planning and politics, etc.

Planning is thus relegated to the position of borrowing from the ethics of other professions and sciences. This task is often undertaken by each individual planner, who relies on whatever values his undergraduate background may have supplied him. This situation constitutes an open invitation to values: not uniform institutionalized values, but widely varying and contentious ones; not standardized criteria by which alternative plans may be evaluated, only a large number of value-based issues.

E. Planning Methods and Models

We have seen the cumulative effect of values on planning. Let us now identify the final locus of values pertaining to planning – those values implied by the techniques and models used during the planning process.

Be they as “scientific” and quantitative as they may, alternative planning methods do not differ merely in their validity, speed, or cost; they often also differ in their underlying assumptions and value implications. After all that has been said about the values associated with the scientific method of the pure, social and applied sciences, this assertion should require little elaboration. However, let us enlarge on a few points.

First, the decision to adopt some particular method is already an invitation to the intervention of values, for most methods are based on some assumptions, and assumptions are a gate to values. Quantitative methods, even though they may seem “cold” and “neutral,” are just as prone to value intervention as qualitative ones, for in addition to the assumptions underlying each particular method, they also possess a collective imperative that attention be restricted to the quantifiable alone.²⁵

Second, the popularity of quantitative methods and especially the rapid acceptance of the computer as an indispensable aid to planning, should be viewed against the background of North American ideology – i.e., the high evaluation accorded to science, efficiency and quantifiability by the “scientism” value cluster.

Third, the rising popularity of the use of *models* (qualitative or quantitative) in planning deserves special consideration. For a model is, by definition, a simplification of reality, and any simplification requires a set of assumptions which usually draw upon values to a greater or lesser degree. Such values are likely to be especially significant where the model is a predictive one (and thus also central to the planning enterprise). Here the modeler’s attitude to social and technological change would be reflected in the model. For example: will he assume that the present rate of growth will persevere as is often done, or will he view the future as different in its essence?

We have outlined in brief some potential areas for value involvement in planning methods. Now let us sketch some similar points regarding planning theory.

Planning curricula and the process of formal planning socialization instill in the

future planner further values – those underlying the various theoretical stands or issues, both procedural and substantive. Within the former category fall such issues as the nature of planning, its justification, its place in democratic society, the merits and demerits of alternative decision models, the types of plans recommended, or the role of the planner in goal setting. Within the latter category one can cite such issues as the attitude to the city, to zoning, to high density housing, urban renewal, mass transportation or the car, etc.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The central thesis of this paper has been that values intervene in planning via several directions, permeating almost every planning activity or issue. We have identified two main spheres of values: those acquired by every person in society through the process of general socialization, and those acquired by professional planners or related professionals through what we have named the process of professional socialization. The relationship between these two spheres of value loci has been depicted in Figure 1. It will be noted that the planner has undergone both processes of socialization and thus shares both spheres of values, while the plan's public and the planner's employers have, for our purpose, undergone only the first process. Thus the potential for value compatibility or conflict among the planner-public-employer lies largely within the first sphere.

The two spheres of values and the value loci within each are not isolated, but intimately interconnected. A flow of values may, for example, originate in the planner's professional values, proceeding almost imperceptibly to alter his initial social values.

The planner "accumulates" values from all the value loci identified. The sphere of professional values is anchored on the sphere of socially-acquired values. Similarly, each individual source of values identified is anchored on the previous source, producing a cumulative effect. Thus the planning profession and discipline possess a significant "load" of values derived from the various sources.

By presenting a systematic theoretical discussion of value intervention in planning, this paper has sought to sensitize planners to an awareness of the potency of values and their ubiquity in the planning profession and discipline.

SOMMAIRE

L'ubiquité même des valeurs dans le processus de planification peut être considérée comme une cause du manque d'attention, jusqu'à il y a peu, à cette dimension de l'activité planificatrice.

Cet article présente un modèle direct qui illustre combien l'ubiquité des valeurs caractérise en fait les activités planificatrices. Celui qui y est engagé, à l'un ou l'autre niveau, a absorbé et exprimé, consciemment ou non, les valeurs qu'il a acquises, lors du processus ordinaire de son évolution et de l'enseignement reçu pour son travail de planificateur professionnel. Les valeurs acquises au cours de ces différentes étapes permettent au "planificateur" de s'adapter plus facilement à certains procédés de planification plutôt qu'à d'autres. La connaissance même de la planification, le langage qui en exprime les concepts, de même que le "système linguistique" impliqué conduisent à adopter toute une série de valeurs, de façon implicite ou explicite.

Les valeurs de la société en général, les valeurs culturelles et personnelles ont leur rôle pour le planificateur, par l'intermédiaire de son employeur, de son client, ou du public auquel il peut avoir affaire.

Les valeurs professionnelles explicites (nous ne parlons pas ici des valeurs morales) sont sans doute les plus significatives et les plus dominantes. Mais parce que, par "idéologie de planification," elles se trouvent dans un contexte de sujets apparemment indépendants de jugements de valeurs, tels que les méthodes scientifiques, les informations des sciences sociales, les suppositions des sciences appliquées, il n'est pas aisé de détecter toutes les valeurs impliquées dans le processus de planification. C'est pourquoi il est indispensable de les identifier et en discuter avec soin.

L'importance croissante donnée à la "planification" dans la société canadienne, tout comme ailleurs, suggère une active sensibilisation aux valeurs de la part des planificateurs professionnels. Si une mesure de la rationalité du processus de planification est nécessaire, une plus grande prise de conscience de l'ubiquité des valeurs dans ce processus peut améliorer sa qualité rationnelle et son bénéfice pour la société.

NOTES

¹A recent article where some dynamics of value-intervention are recognized is: Martin Rein, "Social Policy Analysis as the Interpretation of Beliefs," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, September, 1971, pp. 297-310.

²This definition incorporates some elements from: Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action: An Exploration in Definition and Classification," in *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Talcott Parsons & Edward A. Shild (Ed.) (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 395.

Some other works: Thomas A. Reiner, *The Place of the Ideal Community in Urban Planning* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 291 and *passim*; Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning," *J.A.I.P.*, Nov., 1965, pp. 331-339.

³Benjamin Lee Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality* (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1956), pp. 212-213.

⁴Lisa R. Peattie, "Reflections on Advocacy Planning," *J.A.I.P.*, March, 1968, pp. 80-8.

⁵Bronowski, a philosopher of science, has made an interesting attempt to show that the value of democracy has been generated from values associated with the scientific method: love of truth, as the basis of science, has led to demands for independence in order to further originality, which has in turn necessitated the granting of freedom of thought, which implied a public acknowledgment of justice, extending freedom of thought to all, and finally leading to democracy. Jacob Bronowski, *Science and Human Values* (New York: Julian Messner Inc., 1956), pp. 77-80.

⁶Example of calls for the politicization of planning: Friedmann has called for the planner to shed the "antiseptic role of planner-technocrat;" John Friedmann, "Planning as a Vocation," Part I, *Plan Canada*, April 1966, pp. 99-124. Webber calls on the planner to assume the role of "planner-politician-scientist;" Melvin M. Webber, "The Role of Intelligence Systems in Urban Systems Planning," *J.A.I.P.*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1965, pp. 289-296.

Some advocates of various forms of democratic planning are: Paul Davidoff and Thomas A. Reiner, "A Choice Theory of Planning," *J.A.I.P.*, May, 1962, pp. 103-115; Paul Davidoff, "Advocacy and Pluralism . . ." *op. cit.*; Alan S. Kravitz, "Advocacy and Beyond," *Planning*, 1968, pp. 38-46; Alan Altshuler, "Decision-Making and the Trend Toward Pluralistic Planning," in *Urban Planning in Transition*, ed. by Ernest Erber (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), pp. 183-186.

⁷See, for example, Melvin M. Webber, "Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility," *J.A.I.P.*, Nov., 1963, pp. 232-241.

⁸See, for example, Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield, *Politics, Planning and the Public Interest* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1955), pp. 301-302.

⁹Edward C. Banfield, "The Political Implications of Metropolitan Growth," *Daedalus*, Winter, 1961, pp. 61-78.

¹⁰See Gordon Fellman, "Neighborhood Protest of an Urban Highway," *J.A.I.P.*, March, 1969, pp. 118-122; and Herbert J. Gans, "The Human Implications of Current Redevelopment and Relocation Planning," *J.A.I.P.*, Feb. 1959, pp. 15-25.

¹¹Churchman has said that science itself must first be justified by ethics. See C. W. Churchman, *Prediction and Optimal Decision: Philosophical Issues of a Science of Values* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1961), p. 380; and Jacob Bronowski, "The Values of Science," in *New Knowledge in Human Values*, ed. by Abraham H. Maslow (New York: Harper & Row Pub., 1959), pp. 52-64.

¹²Bronowski, *Ibid.*; and Israel Scheffler, *Science and Subjectivity* (Indianapolis: The Merrill Co. Inc., 1967), p. 10.

¹³Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1964) p. 381; and Scheffler, *Ibid.*, pp. 1-19 and *passim*.

¹⁴Churchman, *op. cit.* pp. 6-7, and Kaplan, *op. cit.* pp. 377-405.

¹⁵Gunnar Myrdal, *Values in Social Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 48-54; Richard Rudner, "The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgements," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-6.

¹⁶See, for example, Ernest Nagel, *The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1961), pp. 485-502.

¹⁷A similar point is made in: John W. Dyckman, "An Introduction to Readings in the Theory of Planning: The State of Planning Theory in America" (Mimeographed; 1960); and Friedmann, *op. cit.*

¹⁸Martin Meyerson, "Utopian Tradition and the Planning of Cities," *Daedalus*, Winter, 1961, pp. 180-193.

¹⁹Herbert J. Gans, *People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), pp. 57-58.

²⁰Stanley Buder, "The Model Town of Pullman: Town Planning and Social Control in the Gilded Age," *J.A.I.P.*, Jan., 1967, pp. 2-10.

²¹Herbert J. Gans, *People and Plans: Essays on Urban Problems and Solutions*, *op. cit.*, p. 129; Janet S. Reiner and Thomas A. Reiner, "Urban Poverty," *J.A.I.P.*, Aug. 1965, pp. 261-266; Martin Rein, "Social Science and the Elimination of Poverty," *J.A.I.P.*, May, 1967, pp. 146-163; and David Preston, "The Human Dimension in Public Housing," in *Urban Planning and Social Policy*, ed. by Bernard J. Frieden and Robert Morris (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1968).

²²Bassett, the central advocate of zoning in the United States of America, may have succeeded in 'selling' the ideas not so much because of the many arguments he offered for the preservation of light, air, etc., as because he included the property-value argument. See E. M. Bassett, "Zoning," Supplement to the *National Municipal Review*, May, 1920, pp. 315-341. See also: Gans, *People and Plans . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 59; and William L. C. Wheaton and Margaret P. Wheaton, "Identifying the Public Interest: Values and Goals," in *Urban Planning in Transition*, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-186.

²³Perhaps it was from observing this process of re-socialization that Friedmann was led to make the assertion that the utopian-reformist ideological stream in city planning is only a myth, and that planning is actually conservative and anti-intellectual. See Friedmann, *op. cit.*

²⁴Francine F. Rabinovitz, *City Politics and Planning* (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), pp. 132-138.

²⁵A discussion of the assumptions underlying quantitative methods and a critique of them is given in: George M. Raymond, "Simulation Versus Reality," in *Urban Planning in Transition*, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-211.

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